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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION FOR CROSS-APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1997). The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2-(3)(j) (1997), and that court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1997). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IN CROSS-APPEAL 
Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in permitting Graham to amend the 
Complaint and in determining that the amendment relates back to the time the Complaint was 
filed? The trial court ruled in favor of Graham on this issue. R. 144-53. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CROSS-APPEAL 
A trial court's decision to permit amendment of a complaint is upheld unless there was 
abuse of discretion. See Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (Utah 
1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative in this appeal, and are reproduced in 
an Addendum hereto: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 (1997) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case set forth in the opening brief of Mark Graham ("Graham") 
adequately sets forth the Statement of the Case and is incorporated herein by reference. See 
Brief of Appellant Mark Graham ("Graham Brief") at 2-7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly reached the merits of this case, and its rulings on the procedural 
issue presented by Defendants' cross-appeal should therefore be affirmed in all respects. As the 
requester of public records, Graham was entitled to seek judicial review of the District's records 
decision pursuant to section 63-2-404(2) of the Utah Code and, therefore, was properly 
substituted as plaintiff in the trial court's discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in substituting Graham as plaintiff in place of the Residents of Davis County Clear Air 
Committee (the "Committee") because Graham filed his motion promptly after learning that the 
Committee was not the proper party to seek review of the records decision; Graham's failure 
to name the proper plaintiff resulted from a simple lack of procedural knowledge made by a pro 
se litigant, and not from bad faith; and the Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy 
Recovery Special Service District (the "District"), which had dealt with Graham personally 
throughout the administrative review and had ample notice of his interest in the proceeding, 
suffered no prejudice as a result of the amendment. Further, the trial court properly ruled that 
Graham's amendment relates back to the time the Complaint was filed, because Graham and the 
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Committee have an identical interest in seeking access to the records to advance the anti-
pollution goals of the Committee.1 
ARGUMENT 
I. GRAHAM IS A PROPER PLAINTIFF TO SEEK REVIEW OF THE 
DISTRICT'S DECISION REGARDING THE REQUESTED RECORDS 
BECAUSE GRAHAM PERSONALLY INITIATED THE GRAMA 
REQUEST AND PURSUED THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS, 
The trial court correctly found that Graham is a proper party to seek judicial review of 
the District's records decision and could therefore be substituted as plaintiff. Under GRAMA, 
the "requester" of the records may seek judicial review of the agency's determinations with 
respect to the records request. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2) (1997). Because Graham 
is the requester of the records within the meaning of GRAMA's judicial review provisions, 
Graham is a proper party plaintiff. 
Graham is a requester entitled to petition for judicial review of the District's decision 
because Graham was personally responsible for the records request and administrative appeal. 
Additionally, throughout the administrative process the District treated the GRAMA request as 
a request from Graham personally. R. 149-50. The trial court expressly found that even the 
1
 The District's curious characterization of its cross-appeal is instructive as to its merit. 
While purporting to feel "duty-bound to protect the integrity of the Court by raising and 
addressing this [procedural] issue," the District states it "would prefer to have the Court rule 
on the merits of Graham's appeal." Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants ("District 
Brief") at 17 n.3. Contrary to the District's suggestion, reaching the merits of Graham's 
request to access public records does not threaten the integrity of the Court nor does the 
Court require any assistance from the District to protect its integrity. With all due respect to 
the District, this case has nothing to do with judicial integrity; rather, the issue here is 
whether the District may levy unauthorized and excessive fees upon Graham, a citizen 
watchdog and critic of the District, as a condition of Graham's access to public records held 
by the District. 
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District appeared somewhat confused about whether it was dealing with the Committee or with 
Graham individually. R. 149. In fact, all of the written correspondence from the District was 
addressed to Graham and devoid of any reference to the Committee. Because Graham initiated 
the GRAMA request that the District treated as a request from Graham personally, the trial court 
correctly found that Graham is the requester of the records entitled to seek review of the 
District's decision. 
Because Graham was entitled to seek judicial review of the District's records decision, 
he could properly be substituted as plaintiff at the trial court's discretion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED GRAHAM TO AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 15(a) BECAUSE GRAHAM'S MOTION TO 
AMEND WAS TIMELY, AND BECAUSE THE AMENDMENT WAS 
JUSTIFIED AND CAUSED NO PREJUDICE TO THE DISTRICT. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting leave to amend the Complaint in 
order to substitute Graham as plaintiff in place of the Committee. Under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, leave to amend the pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(a). Utah courts interpret Rule 15(a) broadly to liberally allow amendments to the 
pleadings. See Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 23 (Utah 1998) 
("'"Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to the end that cases may be fully and 
fairly presented on their merits."'") (quoting Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 
1993) (quoting Hansen v. Luke. 46 Utah 26, 38, 148 P. 452, 457 (1915))); Gillman v. Hansen, 
26 Utah 2d 165, 168, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) ("The rule in this state has always been to 
allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is this true before trial."); Keller 
v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 350, 199 P.2d 562, 565 (1948) ("The rules governing amendment of 
pleadings are very broad and liberal in this state."). In Utah, "wide latitude is granted the trial 
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court in permitting amendments to pleadings, and so long as there is no abuse of discretion, such 
rulings will not be overturned." Keller, 114 Utah at 351, 199 P.2d at 565. 
The decision to permit amendments to the pleadings rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court. See First OK Corp. v. Curtis, 550 P.2d 157, 158 (Utah 1976); Dupler v. Yates. 10 
Utah 2d 251, 270, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025, 
1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In exercising that discretion, Utah courts have focused on three 
factors: the timeliness of the motion, the justification given by the movant for delay, and the 
resulting prejudice to the responding party. See Kleinert. 854 P.2d at 1028. In this case, each 
of these factors supports the trial court's grant of leave to amend the Complaint. 
First, Graham's motion to amend was timely because he filed it promptly after learning 
that the Committee was not the proper party to seek judicial review of the records decision. In 
Keller, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff in a 
claim and delivery action to amend his complaint to allege the element of ownership where the 
plaintiff sought the amendment as soon as the defect in the pleading was called to the attention 
of the court by defendant's motion for a directed verdict. See Keller, 114 Utah at 350-52, 199 
P.2d at 565. Likewise, the District's Answer in this case notified Graham that he was not 
permitted to represent the Committee pro se and that the Committee was not the proper party 
to seek judicial review of the District's records decision. As soon as the defect in the Complaint 
was called to his attention, Graham sought to amend the Complaint to substitute himself as 
plaintiff. The timeliness of Graham's motion supports the trial court's decision to allow the 
amendment. 
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Second, Graham's failure to name the proper plaintiff resulted from a pro se plaintiff's 
understandable lack of knowledge concerning legal procedure and not from bad faith or dilatory 
motives. Graham filed the Complaint within the thirty-day period provided by section 63-2-
404(2)(b) of the Utah Code with a good faith belief that the Committee was the proper plaintiff 
and was properly represented. The error in naming the plaintiff was not an attempt to 
circumvent the statute of limitations or cause undue delay. Rather, Graham reasonably believed, 
based on his dealings with the District, that he was properly representing the interests he shared 
with the Committee by appealing the District's decision in the Committee's name. As a layman 
acting pro se, Graham's lack of knowledge is ample justification for the pleading error and 
supports the trial court's decision to allow the amendment. See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 
Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1991) (M[T]his Court has generally been more lenient with pro 
se litigants . . . ."). 
Finally, the trial court's decision should be upheld because the amendment did not result 
in any prejudice to the District. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a "primary consideration 
that a trial judge must take into account in determining whether leave should be granted is 
whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated 
for which he had not had time to prepare." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 
(Utah 1983) (finding no error in allowing amendment late in trial where record did not need to 
be amplified by either party to permit adjudication of new issue). In this case, Graham did not 
seek to amend the Complaint to raise unanticipated issues which might result in prejudice to the 
District. Rather, he simply sought to substitute himself as the plaintiff in the lawsuit. The 
District dealt with Graham personally throughout the administrative review of Graham's 
fgraham\rcsponse.brf(klm)] 
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GRAMA request and had ample notice of Graham's interest in the proceeding. Instead of 
suffering prejudice as a result of the amendment, the District was merely required to litigate the 
merits of Graham's case. In the absence of prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted a 
policy of resolving cases on their merits rather than on procedural technicalities. See Meyers 
v. Interwest Corp. 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1981). Given this policy, the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion under Rule 15(a) by granting Graham's motion to amend where there was 
no prejudice to the District. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT SHOULD RELATE BACK TO THE DATE OF FILING 
BECAUSE THE COMMITTEE AND GRAHAM SHARE AN IDENTITY OF 
INTEREST. 
Because the Committee and Graham share an identity of interest, the trial court properly 
allowed the Amended Complaint to relate back to the date of filing, thereby making Graham's 
appeal timely. The general rule allows the amendment to relate back to the date of filing 
"[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence, set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(c).2 By allowing amendments to the pleadings to relate back to the date of the 
2
 The District suggests that the rules of civil procedure permitting amendment of a 
pleading ffpresume[] that the original filing of the pleading was otherwise valid," or in other 
words, that there are some pleading defects that are beyond the help of the provisions of 
Rule 15. District Brief at 21. The District's assertion is wholly unsupported by authority 
and, as explained throughout this Response Brief, completely ignores the purpose of the rule, 
which is to save pleadings that, absent the rule, would be "void" or "invalid." See, e.g., 
Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1409 (D. Col. 1998) (granting motion to amend 
complaint where original claim became void when statute on which it was based was 
declared unconstitutional); Unilever (Raw Materials) Ltd. v. M/T Stolt BoeL 77 F.R.D. 384, 
386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting motion to amend complaint to substitute plaintiff where 
original claim was void because wrong party brought suit). 
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original filing, Rule 15(c) allows for additional claims or defenses to be brought "even if a 
statute of limitations has run during the intervening time." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works 
Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (affirming trial court's conclusion that 
amendment related back where claim in amended complaint was based on essentially same 
transaction as original complaint). Generally, Rule 15(c) only applies to the addition of new 
claims or defenses, not to the addition or substitution of parties. See Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). 
However, an exception allows for relation back "when new and old parties have an 
identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved that the relation back is not prejudicial." 
Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). According to the Utah Supreme 
Court, the "rationale underpinning this exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a 
statute of limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim. Such is particularly valid where, as 
here, the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved 
in them unofficially, from an early stage." IcL 
In this case, the trial court found an identity of interest between Graham and the 
Committee in seeking access to the government records regarding the stack tests. R. 150, 151. 
In fact, the Committee's interest is indistinguishable from Graham's interest in seeking access 
to the records to advance the anti-pollution goals of the Committee. Not only did Graham and 
the Committee share a common interest in viewing the government records, but Graham, the 
substituted plaintiff, was also involved in the proceedings from the earliest stage. Because the 
Doxev-Lavton exception requiring identity of interest is satisfied, the trial court properly ruled 
[graham\rcsponse.brf(klm)] - 8 -
that the amendment substituting Graham as plaintiff should relate back to the date of the original 
filing. 
Tracy-Burke Associates v. Department of Employment Security, 699 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam), and sections 42-2-5 et seq. of the Utah Code (Utah's assumed name statute) 
do not require a different result. Tracy-Burke is inapposite because, as the trial court observed, 
the Tracy-Burke court never addressed whether the corporation could have corrected its actions 
with the appearance of counsel. R. 148. Moreover, even had Tracy-Burke held that the 
corporation's petition for review was not correctable, Tracv-Burke would still be distinguishable 
from this case. In Tracy-Burke, the nonlawyer president of a corporation insisted on 
representing the company before the Utah Supreme Court, even after she was warned she could 
not do so. See Tracy-Burke Associates, 699 P.2d at 688. Permitting the corporation to correct 
its mistake would have been unjust and ineffectual because the corporation already had been 
warned and provided such opportunity. Additionally, there is no Utah rule of appellate 
procedure instructing appellate courts to grant leave to correct technical mistakes in pleadings. 
By contrast, in this case, Graham, pursuant to a rule of civil procedure expressly directing 
district courts to freely grant leave to amend, promptly moved to amend his Complaint after 
learning of the defect in naming the plaintiff. 
As with Tracv-Burke, Utah's assumed name statute simply does not speak to the 
procedural issue in this appeal. The statute does not indicate that a complaint filed by an 
unregistered person is unamendable. More importantly, the Committee does not fall within the 
purview of the statute. The statute only applies to persons who carry on or transact "business" 
in Utah, and requires the registrant to set forth the name of the "owner" of the business, and the 
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"principal place of business." See Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5(1) (1997). The purpose of the 
statute is to protect people who transact business with persons under the assumed name. See 
Putnam v. Industrial Comm'n. 80 Utah 187, 205, 14 P.2d 973, 982 (1932) (discussing earlier 
version of assumed name statute) . The terms quoted above from the statute, considered with 
the policy of the statute in mind, clearly indicate that the statute is intended to apply only to 
persons or entities engaged in commerce or transactions involving the exchange of money, 
services, or other items of value. The Committee, which does not carry on any "business" or 
commerce of any kind, does not have an "owner," and does not have a "principal place of 
business," is not subject to the statute. 
IV. BECAUSE THE AMENDMENT REMEDIED ANY DEFECTS IN THE 
COMPLAINT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE PRO SE REPRESENTATION OF THE COMMITTEE OR 
VIOLATION OF THE ASSUMED NAMES STATUTE. 
The trial court properly refused to dismiss Graham's case because the amendment 
substituting Graham as plaintiff remedied any defects in the original Complaint. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate to pursue that policy 
which favors resolution of disputes on the merits rather than technicalities. Accordingly, 
amendments are allowed to complaints and process, even though the amendment relates back to 
the time of original filing and even though, but for the right to amend, the limitation period 
would have run." Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1981) (holding that trial 
court had jurisdiction to grant permission to amend summons even though statute of limitations 
had run). To advance this judicial policy, Rules 15(a) and 15(c) provide a mechanism that 
allows parties to correct oversights, errors, or omissions in the pleadings. 
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In this case, the trial court properly employed Rules 15(a) and 15(c) to remedy a 
technical error in naming the plaintiff which would have otherwise resulted in dismissal. It 
would undermine the purpose of the liberal amendment rules to hold that despite the curative 
amendment, Graham's case should have nonetheless been dismissed due to defects in the original 
Complaint. See Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1996) (stating that 
Rule 15 attempts to insure "that a technical error in the pleadings could no longer defeat the 
parties' right to proceed on the merits"). Therefore, the trial court's November 18,1997 Ruling 
denying the District's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Graham respectfully submits that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in permitting Graham to amend his Complaint and allowing the amendment to 
relate back to the time the original Complaint was filed. Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
the trial court's Ruling permitting such amendment and denying the District's Motion to Dismiss 
or for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 7S_ day of November, 1998. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Dpellant/Cross-Appellee/ 
lintiff Mark Graham 
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ADDENDUM TO RESPONSE BRIEF 
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63-2-404 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
63-2-404. Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition 
for judicial review by the district court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the 
records committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for 
judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served 
with notice of the petition in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a 
governmental entity's determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402 
(lXb). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the 
records request by either providing the requested records or denying 
the request in whole or in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity 
failed to respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-40l(l)(b) 
occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determi-
nation under Section 63-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is 
taken, if the petitioner brought a prior appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that 
issued the initial determination with a copy of that determination; 
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; 
and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the 
court shall allow the claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court 
the reasons for the claim of business confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be 
in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence 
presented to the records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various 
interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure 
or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information properly classified as 
private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs 
the interest favoring restriction of access. 
36 
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(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the request-
er's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect privacy 
interests in the case of private or controlled records, business confidenti-
ality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections 63-2-
304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest in the case of 
other protected records. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-404, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
1991, ch. 259, § 29; 1992, ch. 280, § 36; 1995, ment, effective May 1,1995, subdivided Subsec-
ch. 133, § 4. tion (1) and added Subsections (l)(c) and (l)(d). 
63-2-405. Confidential treatment of records for which no 
exemption applies. 
(1) A court may, on appeal or in a declaratory or other action, order the 
confidential treatment of records for which no exemption from disclosure 
applies if: 
(a) there are compelling interests favoring restriction of access to the 
record; and 
(b) the interests favoring restriction of access clearly outweigh the 
interests favoring access. 
(2) If a governmental entity requests a court to restrict access to a record 
under this section, the court shall require the governmental entity to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the lead party in opposing the govern-
mental entity's request, if: 
(a) the court finds that no statutory or constitutional exemption from 
disclosure could reasonably apply to the record in question; and 
(b) the court denies confidential treatment under this section. 
(3) This section does not apply to records that are specifically required to be 
public under statutory provisions outside of this chapter or under Section 
63-2-301, except as provided in Subsection (4). 
(4) (a) Access to drafts and empirical data in drafts may be limited under 
this section, but the court may consider, in its evaluation of interests 
favoring restriction of access, only those interests that relate to the 
underlying information, and not to the deliberative nature of the record. 
(b) Access to original data in a computer program may be limited under 
this section, but the court may consider, in its evaluation of interests 
favoring restriction of access, only those interests that relate to the 
underlying information, and not to the status of that data as part of a 
computer program. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-405, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 280, § 37. 
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any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to 
him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the 
third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a coun-
terclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third 
party to be brought in under circumstances which under this 
rule would entitle a defendant to do so. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the origi-
nal pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended 
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues 
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that 
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in main-
taining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party 
to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or 
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the 
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are 
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have hap-
pened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original 
pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party 
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specify-
ing the time therefor. 
Rule i6# P r e t r i a l confe rences , s chedu l ing , and manage-
ment confe rences . 
. W Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its 
**cretion or upon motion of a party, may direct the attorneys 
Jfthe parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before 
* for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes 
*M> expediting the disposition of the action; 
v2) establishing early and continuing control so that the 
^ ^ will not be protracted for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thor-
ough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly 
disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any action, 
in addition to any pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, 
the court in its discretion may direct that a scheduling or 
management conference be held. The court may direct the 
attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court 
Scheduling or management conferences may also be held by 
way of telephone conferencing between the court and counsel 
as the particular case may require. Decisions and agreements 
reached at scheduling and management conferences may be 
formally made an order of the court. At the conference, the 
court may consider the following matters: 
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including 
the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties 
or amendment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of 
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations 
regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings 
from the court on admissibility of evidence; 
(6) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need 
for and schedule for filing and exchanging trial briefs, and the 
dates for a final pretrial and scheduling conference and for a 
trial; 
(7) the advisability of referring matters to a lower court 
tha t has appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case; 
(8) the possibility of settlement; 
(9) the need for adopting special procedures for managing 
particularly difficult or protracted actions that may involve 
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or 
unusual proof problems; 
(10) the form and substance of a pretrial order, if it is 
determined that a formal pretrial order is necessary in the 
particular case; and 
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the 
case. 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action 
where a final pretrial conference has been ordered, it shall be 
held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under the 
circumstances. The conference shall be attended by at least 
one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the 
parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless 
waived by the court, shall have available, either in person or 
by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to 
make binding decisions regarding settlement. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a 
scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made on 
behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a 
party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney 
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its 
own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as 
are just, and among others, any of the orders provided.in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B), (C), CD). In lieu of or in addition to any other 
sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney 
representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, includ-
ing attorney fees, unless the court finds that the noncompli-
ance was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutes, in addition to those set forth in Graham's opening brief, are 
determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-204 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-303 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.6 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1998) 
Copies of the foregoing provisions are provided in an Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT' 
I. THE DISTRICT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 63-2-203(2) 
ERRONEOUSLY IGNORES THE CONTEXT OF GRAMA AS A 
WHOLE. 
As Graham pointed out in his opening brief, a governmental entity in Utah is 
authorized to charge fees for records access only if the "governmental entity compiles a record 
in a form other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-203(2) (1997); see Graham Brief at 9-12. The District contends that to "compile a 
record" for purposes of section 63-2-203(2) means to gather documents from various files and 
put them into a new arrangement. See District Brief at 27-28. The District arrives at this 
1
 Contrary to the suggestion of the District, all of the issues presented for review in 
Graham's opening brief were preserved in the trial court. All of the issues presented were 
raised in Graham's motion for summary judgment and decided by the trial court. R. 
159-73, 223-27, 245-54. 
[graham\responsc.brf(klm)] - 1 -
definition by looking to dictionary definitions of "compile" and "form" and by considering 
other words in section 63-2-203(2). See id at 26 2 7 1 1 le Di « tri irt's mode of stati itory 
construction, however, is seriously flawed. 
Defining the terms "compile" and "form" b> the selective use c f dictionai ;j definitions 
is a flawed method of statutory construction, particularly where, as here, the District gives no 
meaning to other words in the statute and ignores the context in which the terms are used. 
IVlan\ vnnls have mulliplf meanings "<'onipilc," foil r\iimpli , nan, in a vacuum, mean to 
gather and retrieve documents and place them into a stack, or it can mean something more 
narrow, such as to cxljl and uuupnM,' ,i In ink, m io MI I ami 11 ipulalc tlala Sec, e.g., 
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 235 (10th ed. 1994) (defining "compile" as, inter 
alia, "to collect and edit into a volume" and "to i un (as a program) through a compi . 
Webster's New World Dictionary 290 (2d ed. 1980) (defining "compile" as, inter alia, "to 
gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly form"), quoted in District Brief at 
>.n i in pmpei iiiea(tiii|j ol tin1 ti'iin "uunpili*" \r IIM'II HI ui \\\\t\ IMII mil\ nc determined 
by the statutory context. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Pi v., 8! A P 2d 581, 590 (Utah 
1 -. -endorsing ;.w, , ; ,.>;.; jry consliLtcli* u VJH.IJ J iu\, 1 , ll.at ILUI^ ui a ii(ntate MP tn 
be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion"). 
When the terms "compile" and "form" are read in context, giving meaning lo aU <>l the 
terms \v\c(l in I lie statute, it is clear that the statute does not permit the District to levy a. fee 
for retrieving and gathering together multiple records in response to a G R A M A , request. I he 
Legislature's \ lse of tl le singi ila i in "o : i i lpiles a record, " I Jtal I Code An n § 63-2-203(2) 
(1997) (emphasis added), makes clear that retrieving and gathering together multiple records 
[graham\rcsponsc. brf(klm)] - 2 -
stored in various filing cabinets is not an activity for which the Legislature authorized 
governmental entities to levy fees. Under the District's strained interpretation, it would be 
lawful for the District to assess a "compilation" fee for a single GRAMA request seeking 
multiple records located in different filing cabinets while unlawful to charge such a fee in 
response to multiple GRAMA requests, each of which sought access to only a single record. 
Clearly, such an absurd result is neither compelled by statute nor intended by the Legislature. 
In addition, a complementary provision of GRAMA, section 63-2-20l(8)(b), informs 
records requesters that they have the right to request records in a "particular format" provided 
they pay the costs incurred as provided under section 63-2-203. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
201(8)(b) (1997). This makes clear that the fees authorized under section 63-2-203(2) are 
limited to requests that involve the transformation or manipulation of data into a specialized 
format. Graham, however, simply requested the records in their existing format. He did not 
request that the District summarize, transform, or manipulate the information in any way. 
Further, the District's interpretation ignores the provision of GRAMA which 
unequivocally provides that "[a] governmental entity may not charge a fee for . . . inspecting 
a record." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(5)(b) (1997) (emphasis added). If records 
requesters must pay "access" and "compilation" fees prior to inspecting records, then the 
Legislature's clearly expressed and unqualified intention that inspection be free is eviscerated. 
Finally, the District's interpretation also ignores section 63-2-103(4)(b)(ii) of the Utah 
Code, from which GRAMA's most direct definition of "compile" can be gleaned. That 
section provides that the term "computer program" does not mean "analysis, compilation, and 
other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the program." Utah Code 
[graham\rcsponsc.brf(klm)] - 3 -
Ann. § 63-2-103(4)(b)(ii) (1997). This provision indicates that an "analysis" and a 
"compilation" are both "manipulated f 01111s" : f "" : -i igii lal data ' ' '""I s tl le i c c t • :»f ' 'con lpilation " 
then, the verb "compile," for GRAMA purposes, must mean to "manipulate the form" of 
"original data." This definition is entirely consistent with the language in sections 63-2-
> V - \ i . - J l »b inconsistent with the District's much 
broader definition. 
meaning to all the terms of the statute, applies only when the records requester asks the 
governmental entity to provide information in a customized format, I he (ml t "in I \ 
construction of the statute is in error and should be corrected by this Court. 
II. "COMPILE" SHOULD BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY BECAUSE 
REQUIRING GOVERNMENT TO BEAR THE MAJORITY OF ACCESS 
COSTS ADVANCES PUBLIC POLICY AND IS LOGICAL AND FAIR. 
Graham agrees that the proper construction of section 63-2-203(2) prohibits 
governmental entities Iroin diaiging llu1 puhln lm Kill linn i ^nuatril " ifh lir MMITII ,nnl 
retrieval of public records in their existing format. See District Brief at 26. 
It is important to observe, however, that maximizing government" s recovery of costs 
associated with records requests, while laudable in theory, is not aniong the public policies the 
Legislature intended to promote when it enacted GRAMA. See Utah Code Ann. § uj-~ 
(1997) (identifying legislative intent of GR A J\ 1.A). Rather, the Legislature intended GRAMA 
to "promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records." 
i IUII < otic AIIII (;> n \ in, i i H.I i. 
[graham\response.brf(klm>] 
To promote such access, GRAMA requires government agencies to bear most of the 
costs associated with GRAMA requests. The wisdom of this approach is apparent. By 
bearing the access costs, government officials are encouraged to keep orderly records and to 
act efficiently in responding to records requests — both of which promote better access. 
Additionally, government officials are reminded that their role with respect to public records 
is that of stewards, not owners, and they may take active steps to promote access. Finally, 
when records are freely available for inspection, the public is far more likely to seek access to 
government records than if "access" or "compilation" fees are imposed. Better access, in turn, 
means better government, as government officials become more accountable for their 
decisions and members of the public have "access to information concerning the conduct of 
the public's business." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(l)(a) (1997). 
Requiring the government to bear access costs is also fair and logical. Because 
government officials are the custodians of public records, they necessarily must act as 
intermediaries to retrieve those records for the public. It would be unfair to charge members 
of the public search and retrieval costs when they could retrieve the records themselves given 
the opportunity. It would be particularly unfair to charge access fees under the District's 
definition of "compile a record," a definition so broad it would authorize assessment of fees 
where, for example, a records request takes more than fifteen minutes to fill simply because 
the records requested are kept off-site. 
Conversely, it is fair to require the requester to bear the costs of a GRAMA request 
where the requester seeks not merely access to government records, but access upon special 
terms imposed by the requester. For example, if the governmental entity stores records in a 
[graham\rcsponsc.brf(klm)] - 5 -
particular electronic format, but the requester wants the records formatted for different 
software, imposition , , :^ . , : , ; .;.„;. nme spent con\ ei tii lg the i ec< * :: :; »; •: : v: •: late and 
authorized under GRAMA. See Utah Code \nn . §§ 63-2-201(8)(b), - 203O 119c>7). 
In short, public policy, logic, and fairness considerations support Graham's 
constr i iction of section 63-2-203(2). 
IIL THE DISTRICT'S PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT FAILS BECAUSE 
PERMITTING FREE PUBLIC ACCESS TO RECORDS WILT NOT 
OVERBURDEN GOVERNMENT. 
The District advances a "parade of horribles11 policy argument by suggesting that 
"abusive requests" would "overburden" government agencies if agencies -. .. s 
* ''eving records in their existing format See District Brief at 31-32 However, the 
record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that abusive requests are or \\ ill become a 
pro** • ' r •- • r-. • .!• nor ha s the District argued that Graham's 
request was abusive. 
Moreo\ ei , - ; i: ead> has mechanisms ii i place t : protect against abi isive 
requests. For example, a government entity is not required to create a new record in response 
to a request, see Utah Code Ann
 b oj-2-201(8)(a) (1997); need not fulfill a person" 's records 
reqi lest that unreasonably duplicates prior requests from that person, see id § 63-2-201 (8)(c); 
may require a requester of more than fifty pages of records to copy the records herself, see id, 
§ 63 2-201(9); cai I delaj responding to reqi lests when the request is for voluminous records, 
or when the request is otherwise extraordinary, see id § 63-2-204(4); and may require 
pa> i i i :: nt of past fees ai id future estimated fees before beginning to process certain large 
requests or if the requester has not paid fees from previous requests, see id § 63-2-203(8). 
[graham\response.brf(klm)J - 6 -
Additionally, government agencies need not provide public access to dozens of categories of 
private, protected, and controlled records. See id §§ 63-2-303, -304; Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
302 (Supp. 1998). 
Finally, authority from other jurisdictions discredits the District's conclusory assertion. 
The District cites Illinois and Oklahoma authorities for the proposition that the records access 
laws of other jurisdictions generally permit a government entity to charge fees for merely 
retrieving records in their existing format. See District Brief at 25. On the contrary, the 
Illinois and Oklahoma authorities, in addition to the Minnesota and Colorado authorities 
already cited by Graham, see Graham Brief at 14-15, 18, strongly suggest that permitting free 
public access to public records will not overburden Utah government entities. 
The Illinois Freedom of Information Act, interpreted in Hamer v. Lentz, 525 N.E.2d 
1045 (111. App. Ct. 1988), and in Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 493 
N.E.2d 1054 (111. 1986), both of which are relied upon by the District, provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
Each public body may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual 
cost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, by any 
person, of the equipment of the public body to copy records. Such fees shall 
exclude the costs of any search for and review of the record, and shall not 
exceed the actual cost of reproduction and certification, unless otherwise 
provided by State statute. 
5 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/6(a) (1998) (emphasis added). Thus, in Illinois a government 
entity cannot charge the requester for time spent searching for and retrieving government 
records. However, if, as in Family Life League, a "special computer program will have to be 
developed" in order to fill the request — that is, if the records must be delivered in a different 
format — then assessment of fees is appropriate. See 493 N.E.2d at 1059. Apparently, the 
(graham\rcsponsc.brf(klm)] - 7 -
specter foreseen by the District — that abusive requests will inevitably result if government 
agencies cannot assess lees lor scaiching ami letneval uisls lias nut appeared in Illinois. 
Oklahoma's records access act, interpreted in Merrill v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
831 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1992), also relied upon , ,;.„ i.uwct, similarly undermines the 
Di'stm f s i»ii!in • arguments. Ihe Oklahoma statute provides in part that "a public body may 
charge a fee only for recovery of the reasonable, direct costs of document copying, or 
mechanical reproduction" unless in*1 rnpirsi i\ '.nli ll'v \\ m i iiiiiinirreial puiiiir.rs" ur "would 
clearly cause excessive disruption of the public body's essential functions." Okla. Stat, tit 51, 
§ 24A.5(3) (1997) (emphasis added); see also Merrill t\ \ I II" 'ii ai Ml 4,:, (assessing, pin: suant 
to this statutory provision, duplication costs where citizen requested, for purpose of benefitting 
his law practice, his own microfilm copy of annual record of names and addresses of 1.3 
millioi i taxpayers a : o\ ( i i compi iter-tape copy of list of unclaimed property, and where 
government agency did not typically provide microfilm or computer tape copies and had 
aireauN niauc uiigiuai iieiunis autilabk1 in reifiirsfei lni inspct tioin mill i"op\irig) liitis, in 
Oklahoma, as in Illinois, assessment of access fees is the exception rather than the rule, and 
yet there is no evidence that abusive requests have beeuine J [nn'Meni, 
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SUPPORTS GRAHAM'S INTERPRETATION 
OF SECTION 63-2-203(2) 
Notwithstanding Senatoi Steele's siateninil lli.il flic lll.ili Legislature moddn! flic 
GRAMA amendments after Colorado's records access statute, see Graham Brief at 14, the 
District contends thai iiiL Colorado statute does not support : . i : \ : : . ; .; ->f 
< T: -.MA because the two statutes do not use "exactly" the same wording See District Brief 
a! M) ">! 11 i- wo\ uncommon, however, for the statutes of two jurisdictions to be interpreted 
[graham\responsc.brf(klm)] A 
similarly, despite some variations in the terms used. See, e.g. APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 
674 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (despite variations between Utah and California versions of one-
action statute, stating that "California decisions are especially helpful to us in interpreting 
Utah's one-action statute, because Utah's statute is patterned after California's one-action 
statute, and because Utah and California have interpreted their one-action statutes almost 
uniformly"). 
In this case, the close parallels between the Utah and Colorado open records acts, in 
addition to Senator Steele's statement, provide good reason to interpret the two acts similarly. 
Graham has already pointed out how sections 63-2-20l(8)(b) and 63-2-203(2) of GRAMA 
parallel section 24-72-205(3) of the Colorado statute, which provides that assessment of fees 
in Colorado is appropriate only when, "in response to a specific request, the state . . . has 
performed a manipulation of data so as to generate a record in a form not used by the state." 
See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-205(3) (1997); Graham Brief at 14. Additionally, Section 
63-2-103(4)(b)(ii) of GRAMA, as explained previously in this brief, parallels the language 
quoted from the Colorado statute because section 63-2-103(4)(b)(ii) indicates that the term 
"compile" means to "manipulate the form" of "original data." See supra pp. 3-4. 
Thus, legislative history suggests that GRAMA, similar to the model Colorado statute, 
should be interpreted as permitting the levying of fees only when the records requester asks 
for records in a different format. 
[graham\responsc.brf(klm)] 
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V. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER AN AWARD OF COSTS AND FEES 
WITHOUT REMAND. 
If Graha i n si ibstantially prevails on the merits of this appeal, this Court can and should 
award Graham attorneys' fees and litigation costs pursuant to section 63-2-802(2) of the I Jtah 
*'
 U ( l u ' i i ^ : U i a l i l \ i n l t /vmii l$ (»3-,. KIJ V ' I 11 ' ^ | P t ill ill'1 r} i i l ' i n r e r c 1 r \ H n f i ill i r i n i i n n i ( > 
the public benefit derived from this case, the nature of Graham's interest in the records, and 
whether uiw uistiiw acted reasonably , . . 
explained in Graham's opening brief, an award of attorneys fees under the statute is 
appropriate in this case because (i) the public benefit derived from this case will be 
Mih^t v - i- ' * w.nec ; lv public's common interest in 
promoting clean air, and (iii) government agencies should be discouraged from imposing 
unauthorized and excess:! \ e fees as a coi idition of access to j: I it lie records, pai ticularl) vv 1: lere , 
as here, the requester is a citizen watchdog and critic of the agency. 
Moreover, contrary to - ,ASLIICI'S assertion, compliance v."- .... 1 
Immi u lity Act (the "Act") procedures is not a precondition to this Court's award of attorneys' 
fees, rhe Act merely specifies the procedure Graham must follow once an awaru wi 
• -' !'V- • • • :• i -,-. :i • " :• ct arises. See Utah Code 
Ann § 63-30-! 1(! )~{2) (Supp. 1998). The Act expressly provides that notice of claim may 
be filed contempt **. J: icoi isl> i •> ith a petition foi ji idicial i svie1 ;^ :)f a govern ment entity's 
records decision. See Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-10.6(1) (1997). Graham already has given the 
District such notice in his Docketing Statement ai id opei ring bi ief See Docketing Staten lent 
at 5, Graham Brief at 19-20. If the District maintains that such notice is insufficient, then 
Graham will file a formal notice of claim against the District for attorneys fees incurred in 
[graham\rcsponsc.brf(klm)] 
this appeal if and when this Court awards such fees. In no way, however, is the filing of 
such a notice of claim a procedural prerequisite to this Court's award of attorney's fees. To 
the contrary, Graham has no monetary claim against the District, and thus no duty to notify 
the District of such claim, unless and until the Court makes an award of attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Graham's opening brief, 
Graham respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the District, enter judgment in favor of Graham, issue an order 
permitting Graham to inspect the requested records free of charge, and award Graham his 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this 2 l day of November, 1998. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
JeffrejoL Hunt NL ^ ^ y 
R. Eric Smith / ^ 
AQornpys for Plaintiff/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee Mark Graham 
[graham\rcsponsc.brf(klm>] 
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GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT ACT 63-2-103 
pertinent interests and \\ 11ir) i in4 consistent with nationwide standards of 
information practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, 
countervailing interests are of equal weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-102, enacted by L, act" means Laws 1991, ch. 259, which revised 
1991, ch. 259, § 9; 1992, ch. 280, § 14. this chapter; see "Revision of Chapter" note 
Meaning of 'this act." — The phrase "this under the chapter heading. 
63-2-lu ,efinitio., 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, 
and related records for the purpose of determining the fair presenta-
tion of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compli-
ance with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and opera-
tions for the purpose of determining their effectiveness, economy, 
efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary 
records of law enforcement agencies and other public safety agencies that 
show the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made 
to the agency and any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative forms mean deter-
mining whether a record series, record, or information within a record is 
public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under 
Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means a series of instructions or state-
ments that permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner 
designed to provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from 
the computer system, and any associated documentation and source 
material that explain how to operate the computer program. 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, 
and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the 
original data produced by use of the program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas (excluding the 
underlying mathematical algorithms contained in the program) 
that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data 
were to be produced manually, 
(5) (a) "Contractor" means: 
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to 
provide goods or services directly to a governmental entity; or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds 
from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on : . . 
that is controlled as provided by Section 63-2-303. 
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicat-
ing, based on a governmental entity's familiarity with a record series or 
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based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable sample of a record 
series, the primary classification that a majority of records in a record 
series would be given if classified and the classification that other records 
typically present in the record series would be given if classified. 
(8) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that 
conducts audits. 
(9) (a) "Governmental entity" means: 
(i) executive department agencies of the state, the offices of the 
governor, lieutenant governor, state auditor, attorney general, 
and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Board 
of Examiners, the National Guard, the Career Service Review 
Board, the State Board of Education, the State Board of Regents, 
and the State Archives; 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the 
Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Office of Legislative Research and 
General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, 
except any political party, group, caucus, or rules or sifting 
committee of the Legislature; 
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court Admin-
istrator, and similar administrative units in the judicial branch; 
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher education or public 
education; or 
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if a political 
subdivision has adopted an ordinance or a policy relating to 
information practices pursuant to Section 63-2-701, this chapter 
shall apply to the political subdivision to the extent specified in 
Section 63-2-701 or as specified in any other section of this 
chapter that specifically refers to political subdivisions. 
(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, agency, board, 
bureau, committee, department, advisory board, or commission of the 
entities listed in Subsection (9)(a) that is funded or established by the 
government to carry out the public's business. 
(10) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable 
for a given period to an individual for services provided including salaries, 
commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, and any board, rent, 
housing, lodging, payments in kind, and any similar benefit received from 
the individual's employer. 
(11) "Individual" means a human being. 
(12) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded 
report, however titled, prepared by peace officers engaged in public 
patrol or response duties describing official actions initially taken in 
response to either a public complaint about or the discovery of an 
apparent violation of law, which report may describe: 
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the complaint, the 
incident, or offense; 
(ii) names of victims; 
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's initial actions 
taken in response to the incident; 
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of damages 
sustained in the incident; 
(v) the name, address, and other identifying information about 
any person arrested or charged in connection with the incident; or 
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(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel (except under-
cover personnel) or prosecuting attorney involved in responding 
to the initial incident, 
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up or investigative 
reports prepared after the initial contact report. However, if the 
information specified in Subsection (a) appears in follow-up or inves-
tigative reports, it may only be treated confidentially if it is private, 
controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 
63-2-201(3)(b). 
(13) "Person" means any individual, nonprofit or profit corporation, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, or other type of business organization. 
(14) "Private provider" means any person who contracts with a govern-
mental entity to provide services directly to the public. 
(15) "Private record" means a record containing data on individuals 
that is private as provided by Section 63-2-302. 
(16) "Protected record" means a record that is classified protected as 
provided by Section 63-2-304. 
(17) "Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or 
protected and that is not exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 
63-2-201(3)(b). 
(18) (a) "Record" means all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, 
plans, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data, or 
other documentary materials regardless of physical form or charac-
teristics: 
(i) which are prepared, owned, received, or retained !:>) a 
governmental entity or political subdivision; and 
(ii) where all of the information in the original is reproducible 
by photocopy or other mechanical or electronic means. 
(b) "Record" does not mean: 
(i) temporary drafts or similar materials prepared for the 
originator's personal use or prepared by the originator for the 
personal use of an individual for whom he is working; 
(ii) materials that are legally owned by an individual in his 
private capacity; 
(iii) materials to which access is limited by the laws of copy-
right or patent unless the copyright or patent is owned by a 
governmental entity or political subdivision; 
(iv) proprietary software; 
(v) junk mail or commercial publications received by a govern-
mental entity or an official or employee of a governmental entity; 
(vi) books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or 
inventoried and contained in the collections of libraries open to 
the public, regardless of physical form or characteristics of the 
material; 
(vii) daily calendars and other personal notes prepared by the 
originator for the originator's personal use or for the personal use 
of an individual for whom he is working; 
(viii) computer programs as defined in Subsection (4) that are 
developed or purchased by or for any governmental entity for its 
own use; or 
(ix) notes or internal memoranda prepared as part of the 
deliberative process by a member of the judiciary, an administra-
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tive law judge, a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or 
a member of any other body charged by law with performing a 
quasi-judicial function. 
(19) "Record series" means a group of records that may be treated as a 
unit for purposes of designation, description, management, or disposition. 
(20) "Records committee'' means the State Records Committee created 
in Section 63-2-501. 
(21) "Records officer" means the individual appointed by the chief 
administrative officer of each governmental entity, or the political subdi-
vision to work with state archives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, 
designation, classification, disposal, and preservation of records. 
(22) "Schedule," "scheduling,** and their derivative forms mean the 
process of specifying the length of time each record series should be 
retained by a governmental entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or 
historical purposes and when each record series should be transferred to 
the state archives or destroyed. 
(23) "State archives" means the Division of Archives and Records 
Service created in Section 63-2-901. 
(24) "State archivist" means the director of the state archives. 
(25) "Summary data" means statistical records and compilations that 
contain data derived from private, controlled, or protected information but 
that do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-103, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 10; 1992, ch. 280, § 15; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, in Subsections 
(9)(a)(i) and (18)(a)(ix) substituted "Board of 
Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons" and 
transposed Subsections (11) and (12), and like-
wise Subsections (14) and (15), to alphabetize 
the defined terms. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Governmental entity. 
Public records. 
Registers under merit system. 
Salaries of college employees. 
School records. 
—School board minutes. 
—Survey questionnaire and responses. 
Governmental entity. 
Former Chapter 2 and the Public and Private 
Writings Act (§ 78-26-1 et seq.) did not apply to 
the Utah State Bar because it is not a "state 
agency" or "public office" within the meaning of 
those provisions. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 
804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991). 
Public records. 
Settlement agreements involving public enti-
ties are public documents. Society of Profes-
sional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 1308 
(D. Utah 1987). 
Registers under merit system. 
"Eligible register" and "promotional register" 
provided for under Deputy Sheriffs Merit Sys-
tem Act, § 17-30-1 et seq., are public records 
subject to public inspection. Deputy Sheriffs 
Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriffs Merit Sys. Comm., 24 Utah 2d 110, 466 
P2d 836 (1970). 
Salaries of college employees. 
The right of the public to know the salaries 
paid to college employees outweighs the right of 
privacy of the employees or of the institution to 
carry on its operations in secret. Redding v. 
Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980). 
School records. 
—School board minutes. 
Notes taken at the meetings of a local board 
of education, which were later transcribed, ap-
proved, and placed in the journal, were not 
classifiable as a public writing, whereas the 
transcribed minutes, in finai form, bat awaiting 
only approval and placement in the journal, 
were a public writing. Conover v. Board of 
Educ, 1 Utah 2d 375, 267 P.2d 768 (1954). 
When a clerk's untranscribed notes are not a 
public writing but his transcribed minutes are 
such a public writing, the minutes should be 
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(7) (a) All fees received under this section by a governmental entity subject 
to Subsection (3)(a) shall be retained by the governmental entity as a 
dedicated credit. 
(b) Those funds shall be used to recover the actual cost and expenses 
incurred by the governmental entity in providing the requested record or 
record series. 
(8) A governmental entity may require payment of past fees and future 
estimated fees before beginning to process a request if fees are expected to 
exceed $50, or if the requester has not paid fees from previous requests. Any 
prepaid amount in excess of fees due shall be returned to the requester. 
(9) This section does not alter, repeal, or reduce fees established by other 
statutes or legislative acts. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-203, enacted by L. accordingly; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted 
1991, ch. 259, § 14; 1992, ch. 280, § 20; 1994, "the fees denned in Subsection (2), or other 
ch. 194, § 2; 1995, ch. 20, § 114. actual costs associated with this section" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- "fees" in the first sentence and "May 1,1995" for 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, in Subsection (1) "April 26, 1993" in the third sentence; and in 
deleted "or compiling a record in a form other Subsection (5)(a) added "except as permitted by 
than that maintained by the governmental en- Subsection (2)(b)." 
tity" from the end of the first sentence and The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
added the second sentence; added Subsections substituted "Section 63-38-3.2" for "Subsection 
(2) and (6), redesignating the other subsections 63-38-3(3)" in two places in Subsection (3)(a). 
63-2-204. Requests — Time limit for response and ex-
traordinary circumstances. 
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental 
entity with a written request containing his name, mailing address, daytime 
telephone number, if available, and a description of the records requested that 
identifies the record with reasonable specificity. 
(2) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying where and to 
whom requests for access shall be directed. 
(3) (a) As soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ten business days 
after receiving a written request, or five business days after receiving a 
written request if the requester demonstrates that expedited response to 
the record request benefits the public rather than the person, the govern-
mental entity shall respond to the request by: 
(i) approving the request and providing the record; 
(ii) denying the request; 
(iii) notifying the requester that it does not maintain the record and 
providing, if known, the name and address of the governmental entity 
that does maintain the record; or 
(iv) notifying the requester that because of one of the extraordinary 
circumstances listed in Subsection (4), it cannot immediately approve 
or deny the request. The notice shall describe the circumstances relied 
upon and specify the date when the records will be available. 
(b) Any person who requests a record to obtain information for a stoiy 
or report for publication or broadcast to the general public is presumed to 
be acting to benefit the public rather than a person. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute "extraordinary circumstances" 
that allow a governmental entity to delay approval or denial by an additional 
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period of time as specified in Subsection 63-2-204(5) if the governmental entity 
determines that due to the extraordinary circumstances it cannot respond 
within the time limits provided in Subsection (3): 
(a) another governmental entity is using the record, in which case the 
originating governmental entity shall promptly request that the govern-
mental entity currently in possession return the record; 
(b) another governmental entity is using the record as part of an audit, 
and returning the record before the completion of the audit would impair 
the conduct of the audit; 
(c) the request is for a voluminous quantity of records; 
(d) the governmental entity is currently processing a large number of 
records requests; 
(e) the request requires the governmental entity to review a large 
number of records to locate the records requested; 
(f) the decision to release a record involves legal issues that require the 
governmental entity to seek legal counsel for the analysis of statutes, 
rules, ordinances, regulations, or case law; 
(g) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect 
from information that the requester is not entitled to inspect requires 
extensive editing; or 
(h) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect 
from information that the requester is not entitled to inspect requires 
computer programming. 
(5) If one of the extraordinary circumstances listed in Subsection (4) 
precludes approval or denial within the time specified in Subsection (3), the 
following time limits apply to the extraordinary circumstances: 
(a) for claims under Subsection (4)(a), the governmental entity cur-
rently in possession of the record shall return the record to the originating 
entity within five business days of the request for the return unless 
returning the record would impair the holder's work; 
(b) for claims under Subsection (4)(b), the originating governmental 
entity shall notify the requester when the record is available for inspection 
and copying; 
(c) for claims under Subsections (4)(c), (d), and (e), the governmental 
entity shall: 
(i) disclose the records that it has located which the requester is 
entitled to inspect; 
(ii) provide the requester with an estimate of the amount of time it 
will take to finish the work required to respond to the request; and 
(iii) complete the work and disclose those records that the re-
quester is entitled to inspect as soon as reasonably possible; 
(d) for claims under Subsection (4)(f), the governmental entity shall 
either approve or deny the request within five business days after the 
response time specified for the original request has expired; 
(e) for claims under Subsection (4)(g), the governmental entity shall 
fulfill the request within 15 business days from the date of the original 
request; or 
(f) for claims under Subsection (4)(h), the governmental entity shall 
complete its programming and disclose the requested records as soon as 
reasonably possible. 
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(6) (a) If a request for access is submitted to an office of a governmental 
entity other than that specified by rule in accordance with Subsection (2), 
the office shall promptly forward the request to the appropriate office. 
(b) If the request is forwarded promptly, the time limit for response 
begins when the record is received by the office specified by rule. 
(7) If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested records or issue 
a denial within the specified time period, that failure is considered the 
equivalent of a determination denying access to the records. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-204, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 15; 1992, ch. 280, § 21. 
63-2-205. Denials. 
(1) If the governmental entity denies the request in whole or part, it shall 
provide a notice of denial to the requester either in person or by sending the 
notice to the requester's address. 
(2) The notice of denial shall contain the following information: 
(a) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access 
was denied, provided that the description does not disclose private, 
controlled, or protected information or information exempt from disclosure 
under Subsection 63-2-20 l(3)(b); 
(b) citations to the provisions of this chapter, court rule or order, 
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that exempt 
the record or portions of the record from disclosure, provided that the 
citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or 
information exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b); 
(c) a statement that the requester has the right to appeal the denial to 
the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity; and 
(d) the time limits for filing an appeal, and the name and business 
address of the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity. 
(3) Unless otherwise required by a court or agency of competent jurisdiction, 
a governmental entity may not destroy or give up custody of any record to 
which access was denied until the period for an appeal has expired or the end 
of the appeals process, including judicial appeal. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-205, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 16; 1992, ch. 280, § 22. 
63-2-206. Sharing records. 
(1) A governmental entity may provide a record that is private, controlled, 
or protected to another governmental entity, a government-managed corpora-
tion, a political subdivision, the federal government, or another state if the 
requesting entity: 
(a) serves as a repository or archives for purposes of historical preser-
vation, administrative maintenance, or destruction; 
(b) enforces, litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or administrative 
law, and the record is necessary to a proceeding or investigation; 
(c) is authorized by state statute to conduct an audit and the record is 
needed for that purpose; or 
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sanctions against persons regulated by a governmental entity, but not 
including records that initiate employee discipline. 
(3) The list of public records in this section is not exhaustive and should not 
be used to limit access to records. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-301, enacted by L. The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, 
1991, ch. 259, § 18; 1992, ch. 280, § 25; 1994, substituted "Division of Forestry, Fire and 
ch. 99, § 2; 1995, ch. 133, § 1; 1996, ch. 159, State Lands" for "Division of State Lands and 
§ 3. Forestry** and added 'School and Institutional 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- Trust Lands Administration" to the list of gov-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, in Subsection emmental entities set out in Subsections (l)(g) 
(l)(b), inserted "from state appropriated funds." and (2)(p). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, Cross-References. — Exemption for gov-
deleted "from state appropriated funds" after emmental records containing digital signature 
"compensation in Subsection (1Kb) and information, § 46-3-504. 
changed "formal charges" to "charges on which 
the disciplinary action was based" in Subsec-
tion (2)(o)(ii). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Judicial records. restricted only for good cause shown under the 
Sealed depositions are "judicial records" and protective order provision of Utah Rule of Civil 
are presumptively public and subject to inspec- Procedure 26(c). Carter v. Utah Power & Light 
tions. This statutory right of inspection can be Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990). 
63-2-302. Private records. 
(1) The following records are private: 
(a) records concerning an individual's eligibility for unemployment 
insurance benefits, social services, welfare benefits, or the determination 
of benefit levels; 
(b) records containing data on individuals describing medical history, 
diagnosis, condition, treatment, evaluation, or similar medical data; 
(c) records of publicly funded libraries that when examined alone or 
with other records identify a patron; 
(d) records received or generated for a Senate or House Ethics Commit-
tee concerning any alleged violation of the rules on legislative ethics, prior 
to the meeting, and after the meeting, if the ethics committee meeting was 
closed to the public; 
(e) records received or generated for a Senate confirmation committee 
concerning character, professional competence, or physical or mental 
health of an individual: 
(i) if prior to the meeting, the chair of the committee determines 
release of the records: 
(A) reasonably could be expected to interfere with the investi-
gation undertaken by the committee; or 
(B) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a 
fair proceeding or impartial hearing; 
(ii) after the meeting, if the meeting was closed to the public; 
(f) records concerning a current or former employee of, or applicant for 
employment with, a governmental entity that would disclose that indi-
vidual's home address, home telephone number, social security number, 
insurance coverage, marital status, or payroll deductions; and 
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(g) that part of a record indicating a person's social security number if 
provided under Section 31A-23-202, 31A-26-202, 58-1-301, 61-1-4, or 
61-2-6. 
(2) The following records are private if properly classified by a governmental 
entity: 
(a) records concerning a current or former employee of, or applicant for 
employment with a governmental entity, including performance evalua-
tions and personal status information such as race, religion, or disabilities, 
but not including records that are public under Subsection 63-2-301(l)(b) 
or 63-2-301(2)(o), or private under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(b); 
(b) records describing an individual's finances, except that the following 
are public: 
(i) records described in Subsection 63-2-301(1); 
(ii) information provided to the governmental entity for the pur-
pose of complying with a financial assurance requirement; or 
(iii) records that must be disclosed in accordance with another 
statute; 
(c) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of those 
records would conflict with the fiduciary obligations of the agency; 
(d) other records containing data on individuals the disclosure of which 
constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and 
(e) records provided by the United States or by a government entity 
outside the state that are given with the requirement that the records be 
managed as private records, if the providing entity states in writing that 
the record would not be subject to public disclosure if retained by it. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-302, enacted by L. lated and stylistic changes. 
1991, ch. 259, § 19; 1992, ch. 280, § 26; 1995, The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
ch. 74, § 1; 1996, ch. 195, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, 1996, in Subsection (2)(d) substituted "a clearly 
§ 67. unwarranted" for "an unwarranted' ' and made 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1995 amend- a punctuation change at the end of Subsection 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "prior to the (2)(a). 
meeting, and after the meeting" to Subsection The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
(l)(d), added Subsection (l)(e), and made re- added Subsection (l)(g). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 62 Am. Jur. 2d Privacy § 1 et Juvenile court records, expungement of, 71 
seq.; 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording A.L.R.3d 753. 
Laws §§ 27 to 30. When are government records "personnel 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Records §§ 35 to 41; 77 files" exempt from disclosure under Freedom of 
C.J.S. Right of Privacy §§ 1 to 8. Information Act provision (5 USCS § 552 
A.L.R. — Public disclosure of person's in- (b)(6)) exempting certain "personnel," medical, 
debtedness as violation of right to privacy, 33 and similar files, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 757. 
A.L.R.3d 154. When are government records "similar files" 
Confidentiality of records as to recipients of exempt from disclosure under Freedom of In-
public welfare, 54 A.L.R.3d 768. formation Act provisions (5 USCS § 552(b)(6)) 
Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d exempting certain personnel, medical, and 
16. "similar" files, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 94. 
63-2-303, Controlled records. 
A record is controlled if: 
(1) the record contains medical, psychiatric, or psychological data about 
an individual; 
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(g) that part of a record indicating a person's social security number if 
provided under Section 31A-23-202, 31A-26-202, 58-1-301, 61-1-4, or 
61-2-6 
(2) The following records are private if properly classified by a governmental 
entity. 
(a) records concerning a current or former employee of, or applicant for 
employment with a governmental entity, including performance evalua-
tions and personal status information such as race, religion, or disabilities, 
but not including records that are public under Subsection 63-2-301(l)(b) 
or 63-2-301(2)(o), or private under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(b); 
(b) records describing an individual's finances, except that the following 
are public: 
(i) records described in Subsection 63-2-301(1); 
(ii) information provided to the governmental entity for the pur-
pose of complying with a financial assurance requirement; or 
(iii) records that must be disclosed in accordance with another 
statute; 
(c) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of those 
records would conflict with the fiduciary obligations of the agency; 
(d) other records containing data on individuals the disclosure of which 
constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and 
(e) records provided by the United States or by a government entity 
outside the state that are given with the requirement that the records be 
managed as private records, if the providing entity states in writing that 
the record would not be subject to public disclosure if retained by it. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-302, enacted by L. lated and stylistic changes 
1991, ch. 259, § 19; 1992, ch. 280, § 26; 1995, The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
ch. 74, § 1; 1996, ch. 195, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, 1996, in Subsection (2)(d) substituted "a clearly 
§ 67. unwarranted" for "an unwarranted" and made 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend- a punctuation change at the end of Subsection 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "prior to the (2)(a) 
meeting, and after the meeting" to Subsection The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
(l)(d), added Subsection (l)(e), and made re- added Subsection (l)(g) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 62 Am Jur 2d Privacy § l e t Juvenile court records, expungement of, 71 
seq , 66 Am J u r 2d Records and Recording A L R 3d 753 
Laws §§ 27 to 30 When are government records "personnel 
C.J.S. — 76 C J S Records §§ 35 to 41, 77 files" exempt from disclosure under Freedom of 
C J S Right of Privacy §§ 1 to 8 Information Act provision (5 USCS § 552 
A.L.R. — Public disclosure of person's in- (b)(6)) exempting certain "personnel," medical, 
debtedness as violation of right to privacy, 33 and similar files, 104 A L R Fed 757 
A L R 3d 154 When are government records "similar files" 
Confidentiality of records as to recipients of exempt from disclosure under Freedom of In-
public welfare, 54 A L R 3d 768 formation Act provisions (5 USCS § 552(b)(6)) 
Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A L R 3d exempting certain personnel, medical, and 
16 "similar" files, 106 A L R Fed 94 
63-2-303. Controlled records. 
A record is controlled if: 
(1) the record contains medical, psychiatric, or psychological data about 
an individual; 
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(2) the governmental entity reasonably believes that: 
(a) releasing the information in the record to the subject of the 
record would be detrimental to the subject's mental health or to the 
safety of any individual; or 
(b) releasing the information would constitute a violation of normal 
professional practice and medical ethics; and 
(3) the governmental entity has properly classified the record. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-303, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 20; 1992, ch. 280, § 27. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — When are government records § 552 (b)(6)) exempting certain personnel, 
"medical files" exempt from disclosure under "medical," and similar files, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 
Freedom of Information Act provision (5 USCS 734. 
63-2-304. Protected records. 
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental 
entity: 
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the person submitting 
the trade secret has provided the governmental entity with the informa-
tion specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial information ob-
tained from a person if: 
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to 
result in unfair competitive injury to the person submitting the 
information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity to 
obtain necessary information in the future; 
(b) the person submitting the information has a greater interest in 
prohibiting access than the public in obtaining access; and 
(c) the person submitting the information has provided the govern-
mental entity with the information specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or prepared by a 
governmental entity to the extent that disclosure would lead to financial 
speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities that will interfere 
with a planned transaction by the governmental entity or cause substan-
tial financial injury to the governmental entity or state economy; 
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or 
confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual competitor of, a 
commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3); 
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future license, certification, 
registration, employment, or academic examinations; 
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair governmental procure-
ment proceedings or give an unfair advantage to any person proposing to 
enter into a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, except that 
this subsection does not restrict the right of a person to see bids submitted 
to or by a governmental entity after bidding has closed; 
(7) records that would identify real property or the appraisal or esti-
mated value of real or personal property, including intellectual property, 
under consideration for public acquisition before any rights to the property 
are acquired unless: 
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(2) the governmental entity reasonably believes that: 
(a) releasing the information in the record to the subject of the 
record would be detrimental to the subject's mental health or to the 
safety of any individual; or 
(b) releasing the information would constitute a violation of normal 
professional practice and medical ethics; and 
(3) the governmental entity has properly classified the record. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-303, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 20; 1992, ch. 280, § 27. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When are government records § 552 (b)(6)) exempting certain personnel, 
"medical files" exempt from disclosure under "medical," and similar files, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 
Freedom of Information Act provision (5 USCS 734. 
63-2-304. Protected records. 
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental 
entity: 
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the person submitting 
the trade secret has provided the governmental entity with the informa-
tion specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial information ob-
tained from a person if: 
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to 
result in unfair competitive injury to the person submitting the 
information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity to 
obtain necessary information in the future; 
(b) the person submitting the information has a greater interest in 
prohibiting access than the public in obtaining access; and 
(c) the person submitting the information has provided the govern-
mental entity with the information specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or prepared by a 
governmental entity to the extent that disclosure would lead to financial 
speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities that will interfere 
with a planned transaction by the governmental entity or cause substan-
tial financial injury to the governmental entity or state economy; 
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or 
confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual competitor of, a 
commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3); 
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future license, certification, 
registration, employment, or academic examinations; 
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair governmental procure-
ment proceedings or give an unfair advantage to any person proposing to 
enter into a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, except that 
this subsection does not restrict the right of a person to see bids submitted 
to or by a governmental entity after bidding has closed; 
(7) records that would identify real property or the appraisal or esti-
mated value of real or personal property, including intellectual property, 
under consideration for public acquisition before any rights to the property 
are acquired unless: 
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(a) public interest in obtaining access to the information outweighs 
the governmental entity's need to acquire the property on the best 
terms possible; 
(b) the information has already been disclosed to persons not 
employed by or under a duty of confidentiality to the entity; 
(c) in the case of records that would identify property, potential 
sellers of the described property have already learned of the govern-
mental entity's plans to acquire the property; or 
(d) in the case of records that would identify the appraisal or 
estimated value of property, the potential sellers have already learned 
of the governmental entity's estimated value of the property; 
(8) records prepared in contemplation of sale, exchange, lease, rental, or 
other compensated transaction of real or personal property including 
intellectual property, which, if disclosed prior to completion of the trans-
action, would reveal the appraisal or estimated value of the subject 
property, unless: 
(a) the public interest in access outweighs the interests in restrict-
ing access, including the governmental entity's interest in maximizing 
the financial benefit of the transaction; or 
(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity, 
appraisals or estimates of the value of the subject property have 
already been disclosed to persons not employed by or under a duty of 
confidentiality to the entity; 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative 
enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for discipline, licensing, 
certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations 
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or 
registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplin-
ary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair 
trial or impartial hearing; 
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source 
who is not generally known outside of government and, in the case of 
a record compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose informa-
tion furnished by a source not generally known outside of government 
if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit 
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known out-
side of government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or 
audit efforts; 
(10) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the life or safety of 
an individual; 
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security of 
governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental record-
keeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation or use 
contrary to law or public policy; 
(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security or safety of 
a correctional facility, or records relating to incarceration, treatment, 
probation, or parole, that would interfere with the control and supervision 
of an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole; 
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(13) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommendations made to 
the Board of Pardons and Parole by an employee of or contractor for the 
Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or the 
Department of Human Services that are based on the employee's or 
contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of any person within the 
board's jurisdiction; 
(14) records and audit workpapers that identify audit, collection, and 
operational procedures and methods used by the State Tax Commission, if 
disclosure would interfere with audits or collections; 
(15) records of a governmental audit agency relating to an ongoing or 
planned audit until the final audit is released; 
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity solely in 
anticipation of litigation that are not available under the rules of discov-
ery; 
(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the mental 
impressions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
governmental entity concerning litigation; 
(18) records of communications between a governmental entity and an 
attorney representing, retained, or employed by the governmental entity if 
the communications would be privileged as provided in Section 78-24-8; 
(19) personal files of a legislator, including personal correspondence to 
or from a member of the Legislature, but not correspondence that gives 
notice of legislative action or policy; 
(20) (a) records in the custody or control of the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel, that, if disclosed, would reveal a 
particular legislator's contemplated legislation or contemplated 
course of action before the legislator has elected to support the 
legislation or course of action, or made the legislation or course of 
action public; and 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, a "Request For Legislation" 
submitted to the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
is a public document unless a legislator submits the "Request For 
Legislation" with a request that it be maintained as a protected record 
until such time as the legislator elects to make the legislation or 
course of action public; 
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel or the Office of the Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst and research findings prepared in response to these requests; 
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public; 
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strategy about collec-
tive bargaining or pending litigation; 
(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and analyses of loss 
occurrences that may be covered by the Risk Management Fund, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or similar 
divisions in other governmental entities; 
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a personal 
recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or disclosure is not in 
the public interest; 
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehistoric, paleonto-
logical, or biological resources that if known would jeopardize the security 
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of those resources or of valuable historic, scientific, educational, or cultural 
information; 
(27) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of the 
records would conflict with the fiduciary obligations of the agency; 
(28) records of a public institution of higher education regarding tenure 
evaluations, appointments, applications for admissions, retention deci-
sions, and promotions, which could be properly discussed in a meeting 
closed in accordance with Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings, 
provided that records of the final decisions about tenure, appointments, 
retention, promotions, or those students admitted, may not be classified as 
protected, under this section; 
(29) records of the governor's office, including budget recommendations, 
legislative proposals, and policy statements, that if disclosed would reveal 
the governor's contemplated policies or contemplated courses of action 
before the governor has implemented or rejected those policies or courses 
of action or made them public; 
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst relating to 
budget analysis, revenue estimates, and fiscal notes of proposed legisla-
tion before issuance of the final recommendations in these areas; 
(31) records provided by the United States or by a government entity 
outside the state that are given to the governmental entity with a 
requirement that they be managed as protected records if the providing 
entity certifies that the record would not be subject to public disclosure if 
retained by it; 
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed portion of a meeting of 
a public body except as provided in Section 52-4-7; 
(33) records that would reveal the contents of settlement negotiations 
but not including final settlements or empirical data to the extent that 
they are not otherwise exempt from disclosure; 
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the decision-making 
process by an administrative law judge, a member of the Board of Pardons 
and Parole, or a member of any other body charged by law with performing 
a quasi-judicial function; 
(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding assistance or 
incentives offered by or requested from a governmental entity for the 
purpose of encouraging a person to expand or locate a business in Utah, 
but only if disclosure would result in actual economic harm to the person 
or place the governmental entity at a competitive disadvantage, but this 
section may not be used to restrict access to a record evidencing a final 
contract; 
(36) materials to which access must be limited for purposes of securing 
or maintaining the governmental entity's proprietary protection of intel-
lectual property rights including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets; 
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a governmental 
entity, including a public institution of higher education, and other 
information concerning the donation that could reasonably be expected to 
reveal the identity of the donor, provided that: 
(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing; 
(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privileges relating to the 
donation may not be classified protected by the governmental entity 
under this subsection; and 
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(c) except for public institutions of higher education, the govern-
mental unit to which the donation is made is primarily engaged in 
educational, charitable, or artistic endeavors, and has no regulatory 
or legislative authority over the donor, a member of his immediate 
family, or any entity owned or controlled by the donor or his immedi-
ate family; and 
(38) the following records of a public institution of education, which 
have been developed, discovered, or received by or on behalf of faculty, 
staff, employees, or students of the institution: unpublished lecture notes, 
unpublished research notes and data, unpublished manuscripts, creative 
works in process, scholarly correspondence, and confidential information 
contained in research proposals. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to affect the ownership of a record. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-304, enacted by L. (19) as Subsection (19)(a); added Subsection 
1991, ch. 259, § 21; 1992, ch. 228, § 3; 1992, (19)(b); and made stylistic changes. 
ch. 280, § 28; 1994, ch. 13, § 5; 1994, ch. 114, The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
§ 1; 1995, ch. 133, § 2; 1996, ch. 79, § SI; made a punctuation correction in Subsection 
1997, ch. 234, § 4. (19)(b) and substituted "of the" for "reflecting" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
 m Subsection (27). 
ment by ch. 13, effective May 2, 1994, substi-
 The 1 9 9 6 a m e n d m e n t > effective April 29, 
tuted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for "Board
 1 9 9 6 m Subsection (31) deleted "of the" after 
of Pardons twice in Subsection (12) and once m « 5 2 _ 4 _ r a n d «A c t„ a f t e r - M e e t i n g s . -
Subsection 33 ; deleted and from the end of ^
 1 9 g ? a m e n d m e n t ) e f f e c t i v e M 5 1 9 9 7 
Subsection (29); and added and to the end of J J J O U *• / A\ L • J- I o u i.- /oo\' added Subsection (4), renumbering accordingly, 
Subsection (36). _ j
 A^^A unk *^ r i „ u l : ^ ^°^: „ J H ' 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 114, effective 
May 2, 1994, redesignated former Subsection 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 114, effective ^ d d e ! e t f e d "Open and Public Meetings" from 
the end of Subsection (32). 
63-2-305. Procedure to determine classification. 
(1) If more than one provision of this chapter could govern the classification 
of a record, the governmental entity shall classify the record by considering the 
nature of the interests intended to be protected and the specificity of the 
competing provisions. 
(2) Nothing in Subsection 63-2-302(2), Section 63-2-303, or 63-2-304 re-
quires a governmental entity to classify a record as private, controlled, or 
protected. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-305, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 22; 1992, ch. 280, § 29. 
63-2-306. Duty to evaluate records and make designa-
tions and classifications. 
(1) A governmental entity shall: 
(a) evaluate all record series that it uses or creates; 
(b) designate those record series as provided by this chapter; and 
(c) report the designations of its record series to the state archives. 
(2) A governmental entity may classify a particular record, record series, or 
information within a record at any time, but is not required to classify a 
particular record, record series, or information until access to the record is 
requested. 
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Applicability of libel and slander exception to Applicability of 28 USCS §§ 2680(a) and 
waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal 2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 79 A.L.R. arising out of government informant's conduct, 
Fed. 826. 85 A.L.R. Fed. 848. 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensa-
tion from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the require-
ments of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
History: C. 1953,63-30-10.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 75, § 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law. Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil 
Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery of 
attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be filed 
contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for 
attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with 
the claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
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Applicability of libel and slander exception to Applicability >,\ 2H IJSCS ^ 2680(a) d 
waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal 2680(h) to ?V>r;iJ Tort Claims Act Iiabilitv 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 79 A.L.R. arising on: :: ?V".rrm,<?nt informant's conduct 
Fed. 826. 85 A.L.R. Fee. >A?,. 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the lizzie Constitution, immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for \:.t> recovery of compensa-
tion from the governmental entity when the govenin^tai entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without j*z>x compensation 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the require-
ments of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 75, § 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil 
Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-10.6, Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entire: >, waived for recovery of 
attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-EOl 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under 5^-^^ion (1) may be filed 
contemporaneously with a petition for review ~zzs&r .v^ion 63-2-404* and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall no: ccc7. " 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter thai :£ -^  <^j to a claim for 
attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brougr.: --^rr.poraneously with 
the claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent ac^x. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitation ?.%?. -*rould apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury again5: c ^ ^mmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurrir^: v.\r.r.z the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or unihr xicr'of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before r^m^ining an action 
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regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant 
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the appli-
cable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, § 6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
. quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
Constitutionality.
 w i t h ^ s t a t u t e Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
Assignment of municipal debt. ^ . ^
 u n d e r f o r m e r 
Clear statement of claims required. , ' 
Conditions for right to recover. a 
Damages not specified.
 C l e a r s tatement of c laims required. 
Defendant's capacity.
 T h e p u r p o s e 0f notice-of-claim requirement is 
Failure to file claim.
 t o r e q u i r e e v e r y claimant to state clearly all of 
q f f i ^ ' f
 f-
 t n e
 elements of his claims to the board of 
u
xT
 c
^
e n c v
 °
 n o l c e
- commissioners or city council for allowance as a 
- N a t u r e of claim asserted. condition precedent to his right to sue the city 
Waiver of objections by city. , u- J • J- *• 
p . , _, J J J
 a n c [ recover his damages in an ordinary action. 
U l t e a
' Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 
Constitutionality. 1167 (1913). 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement . 
in giving the affected governmental entity an Condit ions for right to recover. 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem- Statutory right to recover is available only 
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces- u P o n compliance with the conditions upon 
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties which right is conferred. One who seeks to 
which might attend changes in administration enforce the right must by allegation and proof 
provide sufficient justification for its imposition bring himself within the conditions prescribed 
as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 
and therefore this section does not deny equal 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 ~ .~ , 
(Utah 1977) Damages not specified. 
A claim that stated the time, place and gen-
Assignment of municipal debt. eral nature of the injury and the sidewalk 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
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